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ABSTRACT
Many public issues require collaboration between governments, private actors, NGOs, 
civic organizations, and individual organizations. Initiating such a collaboration is 
challenging, but sustaining such a partnership can be even more difficult. This 
paper aims to explore what types of collaborative governance structures (CGSs) are 
found in urban gardens that have continued to exist over the years and that have 
been discontinued. In order to do this, we analysed 14 urban gardens in the 
Netherlands as striking examples of CGSs. By applying Fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (FsQCA), we were able to unravel plausible explanations for 
gardens that (did not) stand the test of time. The analysis shows that financial 
independence, strong institutionalization, and having a small core group of volunteers 
is the most important configuration for the durability of an urban garden. Even 
though some gardens were meant to be temporary, this structure made them durable. 
Two urban gardens – envisioned to be temporal – did not develop an institutional 
design or financial independence, which led to their discontinuation.
KEYWORDS Collaborative governance structure; fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA); urban 
gardens
Introduction
Recently, the scholarly literature has shifted to a new focus on collaborative arr 
angements in urban governance (Edelenbos, van Meerkerk, and Schenk 2016; Rosol 
2010, p. 549; Van Meerkerk, Kleinhans, and Molenveld 2018). Frantzeskaki (2019, 104) 
described them as a way for residents to reclaim the public space and self-govern the 
domain, which is a move away from a nanny state providing such services (Rosol 
2010). Collaborative governance is heralded as a meaningful concept to understand the 
complexity of such collaborative structures (Ansell and Gash 2007).
This paper examines urban gardens from the perspective of collaborative govern-
ance structures (CGSs). This concept can be defined as public policy or service- 
oriented, cross-organizational systems involving a range of autonomous organizations 
or individuals representing different interests and/or jurisdictions (Emerson and 
Gerlak 2014, 769).
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To date, research on CGSs has predominantly focused on the barriers and success 
factors present in government-initiated collaborative structures and the possibilities 
for multiple actors to join CGSs (Erickson et al. 2003; Newman et al. 2004; Voets, 
Verhoest, and Molenveld 2015). Looking at other bodies of literature, we find more 
conditions and key factors that determine the quality of cross-sector collaboration 
(Bryson, Crosby, and Middleton Stone 2006), the effectiveness of governance networks 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2009), or their limitations (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). This 
research adds to these bodies of literature an empirical explanation why certain factors 
contribute to the endurance of such a collaboration and (more importantly) how 
combinations of these factors explain collaboration. In doing so, this research adds 
a more nuanced perspective on the effect of certain factors on a collaborative outcome.
Ansell and Gash (2007), however, advocated for a contingency approach to colla-
borative governance structures and urged researchers to delve into the contextual 
conditions that might facilitate or discourage a structure. In other words, research 
has yet to show how combinations of conditions affect the durability of CGSs 
(Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012, 22). To this end, we compare 14 similar CGSs 
within urban spatial planning. The cases involve urban gardens as examples of CGS. 
These gardens entail a partnership between citizens, civic organizations, and public 
authorities concerned with the initiation and maintenance of the garden. In doing so, 
this research adds a nuanced perspective on the effect of certain factors on 
a collaborative outcome. By applying a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(FsQCA) (Ragin 2008a), we are able to identify what conditions are necessary and 
sufficient in urban gardens that show to be durable over time. This paper intends to 
answer the following research question: What kind of collaborative governance struc-
tures (CGSs) in urban gardens are durable over time, and what conditions explain their 
durability?
This research adds to the bodies of literature on collaborative governance (1) an 
empirical explanation about what individual conditions matter when looking to CGSs 
and (2) how combinations of these conditions explain the durability of CGSs. Firstly, 
our goal is to identify conditions that might explain the durability of CGSs. Therefore, 
the next section elaborates on the concept of collaborative governance and the notion 
of CGS. We describe the assumed critical factors and ‘translate’ them into factors for 
analysis. In order to enhance our understanding, we study the various configurations 
of conditions that can explain the durability of CGSs and how they interact with each 
other. In the subsequent section, we provide information on our case selection, explain 
why these cases are illustrative for CGSs, and elaborate on the method. In the section 
after that, the results of our study are shown. Next, we interpret these findings and 
discuss their implications for our understanding of CGSs. We conclude the paper by 
acknowledging the limitations of this study and suggesting directions for future 
research.
What conditions collaborative governance structures?
Both Ansell and Gash (2007) and Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) published 
widely cited literature reviews and described a structure as the building block for 
a steady collaborative governance process over time (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 
2012, 5). One of the key features of CGS is the inclusion and diverse roles of non-state 
actors (Pahl-Wostl 2009, 357). First, the word governance encompasses coordination 
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and steering processes which establish formal and informal institutions that guide 
behaviour (Scharpf 1997; Stoker 1998). What makes a governance arena a structure is 
the relative strength of its formal and informal procedures and institutions, respec-
tively (Pahl-Wostl 2009, 356). CGSs develop intentional institutional arrangements 
and procedural norms that foster collaboration (Emerson and Gerlak 2014). Thereby, 
the formal character of such collaboration is strengthened.
Both Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) and Ansell and Gash (2007) described 
the establishment of such collaborative governance structures, thereby unravelling the 
variables that condition the structure. The structure in a particular system assists in 
public decision-making procedures about a given area which converges actors’ expec-
tations (Emerson et al., p.6). The conditions outlined in the collaborative governance 
literature represent a large set of possible conditions and configurations (i.e. combina-
tion of conditions) that can be present or absent in practice. Both Ansell and Gash 
(2007) and Emerson et al. (2012) saw the stages within a CGS as a cyclical and iterative 
process, which comprises elements of trust-building, leadership, creating a shared 
understanding, commitment, and institutional design. Hence, CGSs take on different 
shapes and configurations depending on their environment and the actors. Ansell and 
Gash are clear and advise researchers to study such structures with a contingency 
approach (p. 562). Contingency theory proposes that different structures within 
different (system) contexts develop different arrangements, rules, and procedures, as 
they have to adapt to their environment. Next, we identify four important conditions 
described in the literature as key to the durability of CGSs.
Many governance collaborations commence with resource asymmetries between 
public, private, and civil organizations (Ansell and Gash 2007). Often these resource 
asymmetries have to do with knowledge and expertise, but one of the key and more 
tangible conditions is an (un)equal balance in resources in terms of finances, means, 
and assets; in other words, financial (in)dependence. When starting a CGS, financial 
resources can be put into the process by a public or private partner of the CGS without 
strings attached. However, more often, due to funding schemes and related account-
ability measures, allocating budgets leads to resource and subsequently power asym-
metries in the partnership between a principal and an agent relation (Van Slyke 2007). 
Financial independence of the structure and having a dedicated budget for the CGS as 
a whole is one aspect that positively influences joint governance (Carey and 
Crammond 2015). It brings about capacity for joint action (Emerson, Nabatchi, and 
Balogh 2012). Whenever a structure has its own revenues and business model and is 
therefore financially independent, the power is much more equally distributed within 
the CGS and with external partners. Being financially independent, for instance as 
a result of multiple sources of revenue is a way to create a dedicated budget for the 
garden and reduce the power asymmetries between the actors within the CGS, for 
instance between a subsidy provider and the CGS. Moreover, financial independence 
gives leeway to reinvest in the development and maintenance of the structure.
Both Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) and Milward and Provan (2006) 
illustrated that durable collaborative networks necessitate more elaborated structures 
and procedures for the activities and management of the work and partnership. This is 
in accord with what Ansell and Gash (2007) described as institutionalization (or 
institutional design; i.e. the rules of engagement (Ostrom 2005)). These rules affect 
relations between actors and the capacity of the collective to successfully govern an 
issue (Scharpf 2000, 764). In fact, rules are created whenever people collaborate, 
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whether it is after a period of time or immediately when the collaborative endeavour 
starts. Sometimes institutions result from a fierce debate; other times they grow 
organically. Often these rules embody the dynamics of previous interactions, political 
or personal views, and power relations (Gupta et al. 2010, 460). They may lead to 
inflexibility and obstruction. Therefore, the extent to which the structure is institutio-
nalized may help explain why a CGS is durable or not.
To initiate and endure the collaboration, associations and collaborations need to 
have support. At a minimal level, this refers to principled engagement and shared 
motivation of an internal board or core group (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012) 
towards a common goal. In a similar vein, Healey (1998, 1541) argued that for a well- 
functioning local initiative, one needs an engaged external network of people, which 
may involve businesses, non-profit organizations, communities, and/or the public as 
a whole (Bryson, Crosby, and Middleton Stone 2006, 44). She stressed that in addition 
to an engaged core team of actors, they need to have dense, strong ties with external 
actors. This is called social capital (Armitage, Berkes, and Doubleday 2010; Putnam 
2000). Broad support of both the core group and external actors summarizes the 
cyclical process of trust and legitimacy building as described by Ansell and Gash 
(2007). These authors mentioned that commitment of the involved actors is an 
essential factor for a well-functioning collaboration.
Ansell and Gash (2007) found that collaborations often have multiple leaders who 
possess the facilitative skills of convening, mediating, and catalysing. The last condition 
is, therefore, shared leadership (Ansell and Gash 2007, 550).1 Ansell and Gash (2007) 
stressed in their literature review that leadership is important in two respects: 1) 
bonding and bringing people together and 2) mediating when the parties reach difficult 
events in the process. Such leaders need to have the capacity to actively promote 
participation, ensure real impact, steer the process and outcome of the involved parties, 
create productive group dynamics, and frame the scope of the process (Ansell and 
Gash 2007, pp. 553–4). Sørensen and Torfing (2012, 8) distinguished conveners, 
leaders who bring people together, create arenas, and set the agenda from mediators. 
These are leaders who mediate different interdependencies, help solve disagreements, 
and establish a common vision. Thirdly, catalysts are people who try to add new 
elements, such as knowledge or people, and they can have an overview of risks and 
opportunities. In CGSs, leaders have to create inter-person and inter-organization 
collaborative capacity, and thus have to create ‘cooperative dispositions and mutual 
understanding of the individuals who are trying to work together on a common task’ 
(Bardach 1998, 307). This aligns with the ideas of Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 
(2012, 15), who stressed that: ‘collaborative governance demands and cultivates multi-
ple opportunities and roles for leadership (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bryson, 
Crosby, and Middleton Stone 2006). These include the leadership roles of sponsor, 
convener, facilitator/mediator, representative of an organization or constituency, 
science translator, technologist, and public advocate, among others.’ Ansell and Gash 
(2007) elaborated upon different roles and functionalities of leaders in the collaborative 
process. In general terms, multiple leaders should foster the collaboration with sup-
portive actions. Hence, shared leadership.
As we cannot include all the elements of Ansell and Gash (2007) and Emerson, 
Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012), we selected the aforementioned major elements that 
could explain the durability of the CGSs. These conditions are presented in the 
literature reviews of Ansell and Gash (2007) and Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 
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(2012) and are conditions for the four ‘building blocks’ as presented by Ansell and 
Gash (2007), that is starting conditions; institutional design; collaborative process; and 
facilitative leadership. We construct the following expectation, based on the idea of 
contingency: If the CGS has a clear institutional design, is financially independent, is led 
by shared leadership to guide the process through difficult patches, and builds enough 
support among both the core team and external actors, the collaborative governance 
structure is expected to be durable. We summarize the conditions in Table 1, with 
reference to both Ansell and Gash (2007), and Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012).
Urban gardens as examples of collaborative governance structures
Collaborative governance scholars have unravelled which conditions are important 
both at the start of a collaboration and during the collaborative process. However, it is 
unclear how these conditions configure and to what extent this configuration of a CGS 
can explain the durability of an urban garden. Urban gardens are a good example of 
collaborative governance because to create and maintain an urban garden, public and 
private actors work collectively towards an outcome: the garden, and later to maintain 
this joint outcome. Within this collaboration, public and private actors have a specific 
role that is often formalized into an agreement or consortium. These roles can be 
complementary or conflicting at times. In general, public actors have a facilitative role. 
For instance, they provide a plot, financial support, or a boundary spanner (actors who 
manage the interface between organizations and their environment (van Meerkerk and 
Edelenbos 2014, 6) who actively supports the garden and its activities. Most private 
actors, such as professional gardeners or suppliers, but also volunteers or community 
organizations, have a more practical role. An urban garden is sometimes a temporary 
activity; in other cases, the initiative is prolonged and continued as an embedded 
practice. In our cases, we see that the future of some urban gardens is relatively certain 
(at the same plot or is moved to another plot). In other cases, the future is uncertain 
and sometimes the urban garden has already been discontinued. Urban gardens are 
common in the Netherlands. The database of ‘Groen Dichterbij’ contained 798 plots in 
2016 (Aryawan et al. 2016).
In order to conduct our analysis, we selected gardens that were similar to four 
criteria. First, the garden is the result of a collective effort (i.e. multiple actors were 
involved in the fundamental aspects of the initiation of the garden, the establishment, 
and the maintenance of the garden). Second, since we are interested in the durability 
of these gardens, every garden has existed for at least three years. Third, these 
gardens are located in an urban area. We included this criterion to make sure that 
the context in which the gardens are embedded is relatively similar in terms of the 
neighbourhoods, possible resources streams, etc. Fourth, in order to enhance the 
Table 1. Selection of important conditions.
Ansell and Gash (2007) Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) Condition
Starting conditions (resource 
asymmetry)
Resources – Capacity for joint action Financial 
independence
Institutional design Procedural and institutional arrangements – Capacity 
for joint action
Institutionalization
Commitment Principled engagement/shared motivation Broad support
Facilitative leadership Leadership – Capacity for joint action Shared leadership
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similarity between the cases, we selected gardens that all serve a similar purpose. 
They are all initiatives launched to create urban gardens and to make cities greener 
and more flood-resistant.
The urban gardens are studied via interviews with key actors (i.e. [former] active 
volunteers, civil servants, and employees of involved housing corporations and social 
entrepreneurs). We interviewed at least two involved actors from each urban garden, 
resulting in a total of 36 respondents. The respondents were interviewed in the period 
from April 2017–February 2018. The interviews were semi-structured. In addition to 
introductory questions about the garden, its origin, context, and functioning in gen-
eral, we asked all respondents the same questions with regard to the durability of the 
garden and about the four conditions as described above (see also Table 1). These 
answers were used to generate the scores on the various conditions. We also conducted 
site visits and a document study. Table 2 shows an overview of the urban gardens. With 
respect to the revenues, we indicated only the revenues generated by activities within 
the garden; funds and subsidies are indicated with the phrase ‘financially dependent on 
third party.’
The research method: fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis
To understand which combinations of conditions lead to the durability or disconti-
nuation of an urban garden, we used FsQCA, a qualitative method and approach that 
describes cases as configurations (i.e. combinations) of conditions. The method offers 
a unique way to unravel empirical combinations of conditions in a dataset of cases 
related to a certain outcome (Ragin 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2008; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012). ‘Conditions’ are what we call independent variables in common 
statistical methods. The outcome is generally referred to as a dependent variable 
(Rihoux and Lobe 2009). FsQCA requires the assignment of a certain score to cases 
in a particular set. A set is a collection of objects with particular characteristics. For 
example, the case of Halte Westplein – an urban garden in the middle of a busy 
intersection – scores low if we look at the set of urban gardens with extensive 
formalization (in fact, institutionalization is absent).
Outcome
To conduct a FsQCA, both the conditions and the outcome need to be translated to 
fuzzy-set categories (Ragin 2008b; Schneider and Wagemann 2010b), which is a fine- 
grained way to explain what kind of membership (i.e. score) a case has in a certain set 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010a). The outcome in our study, durability, is operatio-
nalized as whether an urban garden still exists after three years. Although some 
gardens were set up as temporal, others still exist. Next, the conditions that we selected 
in the theoretical section on collaborative governance structures were also translated in 
four-value fuzzy sets. These four-value fuzzy sets are described as displayed in Table 3.
In this study we consider financial (in-) dependence of the CGS as the most tangible 
condition for possible resource asymmetries among actors. Some gardens deliberately 
decided not to develop a business model or were not successful in developing one; as 
a result, they are financially dependent. We scored these gardens a 0. Gardens which 
turn to traditional ad-hoc fundraising or received seed money scored 0.33. Gardens 
that count on grants and long-term contracts from foundations and government 
sources received a 0.66 on the scale of financial independence. Gardens that are fully 
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independent and have multiple revenue sources scored a 1, which indicates that they 
are fully in the set of financially independent urban gardens.
Some gardens are loosely organized and not overly formal. These gardens scored 
a 0; in other words, strong institutionalization is absent. Sometimes, the garden is 
semi-attached to an organization, but autonomous. These gardens score 0.33 on 
institutionalization. If the garden is led by a social entrepreneur, as way of organizing 
the organization, communication and activities it scored 0.66. When a garden is laid 
down in a legal form, the rules of the game are more formal and the garden scored a 1 
in terms of institutionalization. We include institutionalization as a condition for 
institutional design (Ansell and Gash 2007) and procedural arrangements (Emerson, 
Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012).
We operationalize broad support as a cumulative condition. If the garden has not 
engaged a strong core group and is struggling to find support, it scored 0. Whenever 
there is a strong but small core group it scored 0.33, and when it has both a strong core 
group and a strong second layer of active volunteers, it scored 0.66. The highest score 
of 1 is given when a garden has the aforementioned characteristics, as well as links with 
umbrella organizations, government, and businesses.
Shared leadership is seen as a cumulative condition, if the collaborations have 
multiple leaders: conveners, mediators, and catalysts shared leadership is present 
(Ansell and Gash 2007). The collaboration scored 0 if none of the skills is present, 
a 0.33 if one of the elements is present, and so on. In Table 4, an overview is provided of 
all four conditions, the set-membership scores, and their qualitative labels.
Including more conditions in our model could have led to a more insightful 
analysis, however this is not good practice. As we have only a small sample (N-14), 
analysing more conditions would lead to higher probability of generating results on 
random data. This is based on the benchmark for the occurrence of contradictions 
developed by Marx and Dusa (2011).
Analysis
To conduct the actual fsQCA itself, we used RStudio and the QCA (GUI) package 
in R2 (Duşa 2007), and the excellent and insightful manual of Thomann and Wittwer 
(2017). By means of the software, we investigated the necessary conditions, which is 
a first step and good practice, as an analysis based on sufficiency can lead to false 
claims about necessity (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b). If a condition is necessary 
for the durability of an urban garden, a particular condition is consistently present or 
absent. Afterwards, a sufficiency analysis is conducted. Sufficiency means that 
a condition (or a combination) leads consistently to a particular outcome (the 
durability of an urban garden; e.g., Benoît Rihoux and Lobe 2009; Schneider and 
Table 3. A four-value fuzzy set.
Condition Outcome
1 = Fully in the 
set
a high degree of a particular 
condition
This means the garden still exists after 3 years and its future 
is relatively certain (meaning that the garden is not 
expected to be discontinued any time soon).
0,66 = Mostly in 
the set
a moderate degree of 
a particular condition
This means that the garden still exists, but the future 
perspective is uncertain
0, 33 = Almost 
out of the set.
partial (but not full) absence 
of a particular condition
The garden still exists, but this garden will be discontinued 
soon
0 = Fully out of 
the set.
Absence of this condition The garden has been discontinued
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Wagemann, 2010a). For the analysis of sufficient conditions, we first constructed 
a truth table using the software, which is in essence a mathematical table that shows 
how many cases adhere to a logical combination. This is done on the basis of binary 
numbers: 1 means the presence of a certain condition, and 0 means the absence of 
a certain condition. For instance, the Bikkershof scores 1-1-1-1 on the conditions and 
on the outcome 1, which means that all the conditions are present and the urban 
garden survived. The software surveys all the cases and counts how many adhere to 
or abandon this pattern, which is how it calculates how many cases consistently lead 
to the same outcome (either discontinuation or durability of an urban garden; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012).
Two parameters are important to assess whether a certain condition or configura-
tion is necessary or sufficient: consistency and coverage. Consistency is most important 
and indicates the extent to which a condition consistently leads to the same outcome 
(existence or discontinuation). If many cases contradict a certain pattern, this para-
meter drops. We set the necessity consistency threshold to 0.9 and the sufficiency 
consistency threshold close to 0.83 (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b) to avoid deviant 
cases in terms of consistency. Coverage is the extent to which cases are either covered 
or entail this particular condition (or combination of conditions). This parameter is 
considered by QCA scholars to be less important compared to the consistency score, as 
it is not the number of cases which is important but the mechanism or the case 
knowledge about the particular configuration. A configuration represented by only 
Table 4. Overview of conditions.
Condition 1 – 
financial 
independence
Condition 2: Strong 
institutionalization
Condition 3: broad 
support
Condition 4 – shared 
leadership






The urban garden is laid 
down in a legal form 
(e.g. an association)
Active support of 
organizations 








present within the 
urban garden









The urban garden is led 
by a (social) 
entrepreneur
Strong inner circle, 
strong relations 








present within the 
urban garden
0, 33 = Almost 






The garden is part of 
a larger organization








present within the 
urban garden






The governance is 
loosely organized (no 
legal form, no leading 
entrepreneur and not 
a part of a bigger 
organization).
Lack of strong 
shoulders
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one case can be interesting, for instance, to strengthen knowledge on a particular 
mechanism (Schneider and Wagemann 2010b, 412).
If a particular pattern is consistent, the researcher takes these cases into the mini-
mization analysis, which can be summarized as: ‘If two configurations differ in only one 
condition, but show the same outcome, this particular condition can be eliminated’ 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 105). The researcher ends up with ‘simple’ paths 
explaining durability and discontinuation.
The configurations in the following paragraphs show the conservative solution, 
which only takes into account truth table rows with empirical evidence (i.e. the rows 
that contain at least one case; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Which means that we 
were very modest when analysing and interpreting, only the data ‘as is’ is taken into 
account. In the figures, however, we go one step further. Fiss (2011) showed how we 
can build causal theories by combining the conservative with the parsimonious 
solution. This latter solution takes into account logical remainders as well, i.e. 
a row without empirical material. This means that in order to minimize the paths, 
this solution takes into account rows that are not portrayed by any case. The 
parsimonious solution is what you get if you take the minimization further than 
the conservative solution, and go to the simplest path. The bold conditions are the 
conditions both present in the conservative and the parsimonious solution, and 
therefore: core conditions. The parsimonious solution considers additional rows 
and shows which conditions are most distinct (see Appendix A). The idea to present 
the paths as real pathways towards an outcome is based on the work of Raab and 
Stuppert (2014).4
Results
In Table 5, the raw data matrix is shown.
Are there necessary conditions?
When we examine the durable urban gardens, we cannot detect a single necessary 
condition which is present or absent in the gardens. Neither did we find necessary 
conditions in the discontinued cases. We can conclude that the explanation of why 










Bikkershof 0,66 1 1 0,66 1
Daktuin – Huis van de Wijk 1 0,33 0,66 0,33 0,66
Voedselbos 1 0,66 0,33 0,33 0,66
Pluk- en proeftuin 0,33 0,33 0,66 0,33 0
Gillis Paradijs 0,66 0,66 1 1 1
Spinozahof 0,33 0,66 0,66 1 0,33
Halte Westplein 0,33 0 0,33 0 0,33
De Groeituinen 1 1 1 1 1
Gras van de Buren 0,33 1 0,33 0,33 0,66
Zeeheldentuin 0 1 0 0,66 0,66
Voedseltuin 0,66 0,66 1 1 0,66
Carnissetuin 0,66 0,66 0,66 1 0
Dakpark 0,33 1 0,66 1 1
Hof van Heden 0,33 1 0 0,66 1
12 A. MOLENVELD ET AL.
a certain garden is durable or not is more complex and does not depend upon 
individual conditions as such. Therefore, we subsequently analyse the (combinations 
of) conditions for durability. The following paragraph investigates these configurations 
(i.e. the combination of conditions that might lead to the durability or the abolishment 
of an urban garden).
Are there sufficient conditions?
First, we built a truth table (see Table 6), that shows which configurations the cases 
portrait. We set the threshold for consistency at 0.79 because this is a good practice 
(Wagemann and Schneider – standards for good practice). This includes the upper 
four truth table rows in the analysis (i.e. minimization process). This analysis of 
sufficient (combinations of) conditions shows three distinct configurations to dur-
ability. These cover eight cases.
Financial independence is a core condition in most configurations, which is 
depicted by the fact that in four out of five successful cases, financial independence 
is considered high. In another configuration covering two cases, the combination of 








leadership Outcome Cases Cons. PRI
1 1 0 0 1 Voedselbos 0.83 0.66




1 0 1 0 1 DaktuinHuisvandeWijk 0.80 0.49
0 1 0 0 1 GrasvandeBuren 0.80 0.66
0 1 0 1 ?
0 1 1 1 ?
0 0 1 0 ?
0 0 0 0 ?
1 0 0 0 Logical remainder
0 0 0 1 Logical remainder
1 0 0 1 Logical remainder
1 1 0 1 Logical remainder
0 1 1 0 Logical remainder
1 1 1 0 Logical remainder
0 0 1 1 Logical remainder
1 0 1 1 Logical remainder
Figure 1. Analysis of sufficient conditions – configurations for DURABILITY. solution coverage: 0.74solution 
consistency: 0.87PRI: 0.81N = 8
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a small group and strong institutionalization is core to the explanation of why the 
garden has continued. Figure 1 shows which configurations lead to a durable urban 
garden.5 The following paragraph analyzes the cases to look for the mechanisms, based 
on the configurations, that explain their survival.
Configuration 1: absence of broad support, strong institutionalization, non-shared 
leadership → durable garden
This is a configuration that explains two gardens. Gras van de Buren is a relevant 
illustration of this configuration. This garden started when a nearby theatre and 
neighbours independently contacted the housing association, asking whether they 
could start a green project on their undeveloped plot. The housing association sug-
gested the formation of a workgroup to further develop this plan. Especially the 
residents who had recently moved into the district were involved. Soon the workgroup 
encountered a problem: there was not enough budget to develop the project, leading to 
a standstill. After approximately two years, the municipality of The Hague contacted 
a volunteer to ask about the status of the project. This conversation led to financial 
support of the municipality, since this project aligned perfectly with its policy to 
improve the neighbourhood. The partnership between the neighbourhood, the muni-
cipality and the housing association is now defined in a formal agreement. This 
document was necessary to institutionalize the responsibilities and resources of the 
different actors and to determine the pact between the different parties. To be part of 
this covenant, the neighbours needed to establish the project in a legal form, therefore 
the urban garden now has an official board. Besides this formalization the responsi-
bilities between the neighbours are loosely defined. The board members are perform-
ing their tasks on an ad-hoc basis. Although, Gras van de Buren was envisioned to be 
temporarily, nowadays the structure and support are that well-developed that it seems 
to be a more durable garden.
Configuration 2: financial independence, broad support, shared leadership, strong 
institutionalization → durable garden
Most urban gardens that endured (N = 5) share that they are financially indepen-
dent, have shared leadership and broad support, and are institutionalized in a certain 
structure, such as a foundation or association. These cases all have diversified business 
models and are therefore (almost) financially independent. Bikkershof, for instance, 
generates revenue through bicycle parking which is then reinvested in the garden. De 
Groeituinen developed a business model with multiple revenues by, for instance, selling 
its harvest at a market and a Christmas tree farm.
Furthermore, these five gardens received support from various stakeholders. De 
Groeituinen receives support from the municipality, as the project fits perfectly 
into the municipal policy to stimulate citizen participation. Additionally, the 
municipality saw opportunities to enhance social cohesion in the neighbourhood 
with this project. To coordinate the project, a board was formed, consisting of 
members who value self-sufficiency. Therefore, it wanted to arrange the resources 
needed for the project themselves: ‘We try not to use the subsidy of the munici-
pality, we will only use it if we are not capable anymore to find funds ourselves.’ 
De Groeituinen is also supported by a group of 20 to 25 volunteers involved in the 
maintenance of the project. Bikkershof also received financial support from both 
the municipality and neighbours. While it can be a challenge to find enough 
willing volunteers, up to now the project has succeeded in finding enough helping 
hands to maintain the garden.
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Another characteristic of these five gardens is shared leadership. For example, Gillis 
Paradijs is governed by a professional foundation that was hired by the housing 
association and had the task to set up the preconditions for a flourishing garden. 
Examples of tasks include organizing activities and ensuring that the rules are followed. 
After five years at a plot of the housing association, the garden had to move. The 
professionals were rehired by the municipality to accommodate the relocation. The 
professionals are not only convening neighbours by organizing activities but are also 
active mediators who maintain contact with the different stakeholders.
The last characteristic of these five gardens involves a high level of institutionaliza-
tion. All the gardens were registered in a legalized form. De Groeituinen, for instance, is 
formalized in an association which is governed by a board. The board has the ambition 
to scale up the CGS to an organization that hosts people with a distance from the 
labour market. De Groeituinen, Gilles Paradijs, and the Voedseltuin were envisioned to 
be temporary; however, the structure and support are so well developed that they seem 
to be a more durable garden.
An outlier (a deviant case in consistency; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013) is the 
Carnissetuin, a garden that was discontinued, although all the conditions that led 
other structures to success were present. The Carnissetuin started out in an 
existing abandoned facility (an educational garden), and as a temporary garden. 
A collective of entrepreneurs called Creatief Beheer (creative maintenance), 
initiated a plan called Resilience in collaboration with a network of organizations. 
The Carnissetuin was one of the many projects of this plan. However, the plot on 
which the Carinessetuin was hosted was eventually sold to a project developer. 
The municipality never contacted the Carnissetuin staff about this, which caused 
protests and conflicts. Consequently, the garden was discontinued. This case 
shows that other factors influenced the durability of this garden. While the 
conditions considered in this manuscript are more alike internal factors of the 
structures, external conditions led to its discontinuation.
Configuration 3: financial independence, broad support, non-shared leadership, 
absence of strong institutionalization → durable garden
This configuration was a recipe for success for one garden, Daktuin Huis van de 
Wijk. It is only possible to enter the garden (which is on the roof of a parking garage) 
through a community centre. The project is financially independent, because residents 
can rent a part of the garden for 50 euro per year. The project is well supported by other 
actors. Its community centre provides utilities for the garden, such as electricity. The 
project also receives support from active neighbours. Each Thursday morning neigh-
bour volunteers work in the garden.
Within Daktuin Huis van de Wijk, there is not a well-defined leader. Leadership is 
distributed among the involved neighbours: each have their own task (e.g., finance, 
sponsors, or new residents). The community centre is also important, because it is 
(legally) responsible for the Daktuin. The housing association created a protocol, to 
which the involved participants comply. If the protocol is violated, the community 
centre is accountable.
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Analysis of sufficient conditions of discontinued structures
Subsequently, we show the configurations for abolishment. First, we constructed 
a truth table (see Table 7). We set the threshold for sufficient conditions at 0.81, 
excluding a clear case of a difference in kind (a case that did survive, Daktuin).
After the minimization process, the analysis of sufficient conditions shows one 
distinct configuration to discontinuation (Figure 2). The configuration covers two 
cases (Halte Westplein and Pluk- en Proeftuin). Both these cases were also 
intended to be temporary. Absence of strong institutionalization and financial 
dependence are core conditions in this structure. Apparently, it was not necessary 
for these gardens to set up an institutional design or a business model, since they 
were intended to be temporary. Figure 2 shows the configuration which led to the 
discontinuation of the urban garden.
Configuration explaining the absence of durability: absence of strong institutiona-
lization, financial dependence, non-shared leadership → discontinuation
Halte Westplein is located in the middle of one of the busiest traffic junctions 
of Utrecht. In 2013 some local residents wanted to cheer up the grey and bleak 
intersection. After a consultation with the municipality, they planted flower bulbs 
in the middle of the crossroads. In the spring of 2014 the project was expanded to 
include 15 moveable plant boxes in which the neighbours could grow their own 
vegetables, flowers, and herbs. Thanks to adjustments in traffic regulations, the 
Halte Westplein project expanded in 2016 into one large plot with a small build-
ing and a communal garden and a second plot on the other side of the road with 
the plant boxes. The project was loosely organized and was not registered as 








leadership Outcome Cases Cons. PRI
0 0 0 0 1 HalteWestplein 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 Plukenproeftuin 1 1
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 Logical remainder
0 0 0 1 Logical remainder
1 0 0 1 Logical remainder
1 1 0 1 Logical remainder
0 1 1 0 Logical remainder
1 1 1 0 Logical remainder
0 0 1 1 Logical remainder
1 0 1 1 Logical remainder
Figure 2. Analysis of sufficient conditions – configuration for discontinuation or non-durability.
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a legal entity. In 2017 the formal leader and driving force behind the project quit. 
Currently, a part of the garden is maintained by a few neighbours.
The project Pluk- en Proeftuin is already discontinued. The garden was located 
in Dordrecht’s most innovative area, called the ‘learning park.’ A closely knit 
group of neighbours was engaged in the project, and along with students, they 
were heavily involved in the garden maintenance. For the students, maintenance 
was combined with an educational purpose, which kept them committed to the 
process. The garden budget came from the municipality and donations, but the 
garden never developed a business plan or institutions to support the durability of 
the project, as it was envisioned as temporary from the beginning. Involvement 
declined gradually, as plans for future buildings on the plot were already in place. 
One of the involved parties explained: ‘If it was envisioned as a park, or some-
thing like that, it could have survived for a longer period, I can imagine that the 
involvement of the neighbourhood would be different.’
Discussion and conclusion
Collaborative governance is heralded as concept to address contemporary policy 
making and public service delivery. Here, these processes are considered a collective 
outcome, produced by a network of actors. Most research addressing collaborative 
governance has focused on the emergence of these structures, rather than offering 
explanations why these configurations are continued over a longer period of time. In 
order to address this issue, this paper aimed to understand what factors determine the 
continuation or the abolishment of a CGS. We found that no single factor can explain 
such an outcome, but rather a configuration of factors.
In our Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), we build on the contingency 
theory of Ansell and Gash (2007). In order to do justice to the comprehensiveness of 
this framework, we translated the theory into four measurable conditions, one for 
each building block. The condition for resource asymmetry was financial indepen-
dence; for institutional design, it was level of institutionalization; for collaborative 
commitment, broad support was our condition; and for facilitative leadership, we 
used shared leadership. Our analysis shows that none of these conditions can be 
considered necessary for the durability of CGSs. Basically, our study shows that there 
is no ‘silver bullet’ for effective collaborative results. If one wishes to understand 
effective CGSs, one should focus on the configuration of different influential factors 
(see Emerson et al. 2012; p 22). In this result, we also recognize the initial approach of 
Ansell and Gash (2007) by presenting their framework as a configurational frame-
work, meaning that the factors they mention need to be considered in coherence, 
rather than separately.
Our main contribution to the literature is how our QCA shows that multiple 
configurations of factors may explain the durability of effectively governed urban 
gardens. The idea of multiple forms of network governance leading to different 
kinds of success is not new (see Provan and Kenis 2008). However, this paper illustrates 
how several ingredients for those configurations (i.e. financial independence, strong 
institutionalization, and having a small core group of volunteers) lead to a particular 
kind of network success (endurance). Weak institutionalization, combined with being 
financially dependent, is essential to understanding the discontinuation of the CGSs. In 
doing so, our analysis shows: 1) although no single factor in itself can explain the 
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durability of a CGS, certain configurations may; and 2) what these configurations are 
(see Figures 1 and Figures 2 i.e. configuration of small core group; strong institutio-
nalization; and non-shared leadership; configuration of financial independence; shared 
leadership and strong institutionalization; or configuration of financial independence; 
non-shared leadership; and weak institutionalization). In doing so, although our 
conditions are simplifications of the building blocks as identified by Ansell and Gash 
(2007) and Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012), we illustrate in what capacity these 
blocks can be considered conditional, with regard to the durability of a CGS. 
Therefore, we add to the conception of what ‘effective’ means in relations to govern-
ance and their networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2009).
The importance of formal rules is particularly interesting, since in the current 
dominant governance paradigm (Osborne 2006) there is a trend towards more loosely 
coupled collaborations with multiple stakeholders. Our results indicate that a traditional 
organizational logic, including fixed responsibilities and accountability structures 
(Alexander 1995), is important to facilitate (continued) collaboration. This underscores 
the notion of Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012, 15) that ‘long-lived collaborative 
networks require more explicit structures and protocols.’ Formalizing agreements, rules 
and codes can help actors make clear what they expect from each other, make interac-
tions predictable, and present themselves as a legitimate organization. Furthermore, 
institutionalization lowers transaction costs and thus, due to institutionalization, certain 
patterns of behaviour become easier than others. The importance of institutionalization 
is also supported by our observation that when such a formalization was absent (even 
winged by broad support and shared leadership), it would lead to discontinuation of the 
garden. Therefore, it appears that organizations gain legitimacy (and resources) when 
they set up structures and/or institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Also, in one of our cases, we found that even though shared leadership was present 
throughout the case, the urban garden was discontinued. This is interesting, since 
Ansell and Gash (2007) introduced facilitative leadership as the key remedy when the 
collaboration seems to fail. Since our most important result is that several factors, 
ideally including those analysed in this article and their interplay, should be considered 
in conjunction for the success of a CGS, our analysis indicates that facilitative leader-
ship is to be supported by other conditions: a small core group; strong formalization; 
and, most of all, financial independence. This makes sense, since it is much easier to 
continue a CGS if there are few people. The scale of some CGSs may require dealing 
with many people. In addition, ideal configurations might vary between recent and 
long-lived initiatives. Hence, our results offer nuances to key assumptions in public 
management and governance literature and the role of management in these.
Although our findings both give an interesting nuance and confirmation of some of our 
theoretical understandings of CGSs, we cannot generalize from our sample. Although we 
chose urban gardens based upon their collaborative governance characteristics, this sample 
is not representative of CGSs in a broader view, since it only involves one policy domain. It 
would be interesting to compare the results of this study to other CGSs in other domains to 
see if configurations in other domains point to the same direction. Furthermore, although 
the sample is small, we are confident that our results are valid, based on the consistency 
thresholds and the ratio between cases and conditions (Marx and Dusa 2011; Schneider 
and Wagemann 2010b). Last, in our choice of research methods and our ambition to build 
on the Ansell and Gash framework, we reduced the framework to four conditions. This 
simplification means that we should be cautious when drawing conclusions regarding our 
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additions to and critiques of the existing framework. However, our results make a plausible 
claim concerning the coherence of influential factors to the durability of CGSs. Moreover, 
sufficient patterns in the successful cases point to indicate a clear direction of where 
successful configurations can be found. Therefore, the next step would be to test and 
validate these configurations in a larger N setting. That would allow us not only to explain 
why CGSs continued or not but also to show elaborated insights on required skills and 
competencies actors involved in CGSs need to have.
Notes
1. Note: since facilitative leadership is presented in the framework of Ansell and Gash as one 
block, rather than a collection of several components, it is unnecessary to distill a condition 
from this block.
2. The QCA script was obtained at the 2017 ECPR winter school course from Carsten Schneider
3. Consistency threshold was 0.79 for the present of durability and 0.81 for the absence of 
durability. The frequency threshold was set to 1.
4. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a089b440f0b652dd00037e/61259-Raab 
_Stuppert_Report_VAWG_Evaluations_Review_DFID_20140626.pdf
5. The paths portrait a mix of conditions, and not an order or sequence.
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Appendix A. Parsimonious solution
Two configurations leading to durable gardens:
(1) FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE (cons: 0.78, PRI: 0.70, Raw Coverage: 0.66, Unique coverage: 
0.44) 
N = 7: Voedselbos; DaktuinHuisvandeWijk; DeGroeituinen,GillisParadijs,Bikkershof, 
Voedseltuin,Carnissetuin
(2) non-shared leadership *STRONG INSTITUTONALIZATION (cons. 0.89, PRI: 0.80, Raw 
Coverage: 0.30, Unique coverage: 0.08) 
N = 2, Gras van de Buren, Voedselbos
Total solution scores (cons.: 0,80, PRI: 0.72, coverage: 0,74)
One configuration leading to non-durable gardens:
(1) Low institutionalization AND financial dependence (cons.: 0,87, PRI: 0,80, Raw Coverage: 0,47)
N = 2: HalteWestplein; Plukenproeftuin
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